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Article 8

NOTES
FRAUis, STATUTE

OF-MUTUAL PROMISES TO MARRY-AGREEMENTS

NOT TO BE PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR OR DURING LIFETIME.The Supreme Court of Washington in Brock v. Button I recently con-

sidered a highly controversial question in regard to marriage contracts.
Ever since the passage of the Statute of Frauds in England romeos,
young and old, have attempted to escape their legal liabilities upon two
grounds. The first is "that no agreement made in the consideration of
marriage will be valid unless made in writing." Courts have regularly
interpreted this clause to mean marriage settlements and not to be extended to the mutuality of the marriage promises themselves. Shunted
from obtaining their goal in this manner men have relied upon another
phase of the statutes of fraud, namely, "that all contracts not to be
performed within one year must be in writing." Here there is a conflict of authority as to the applicability of the rule to marriage contracts. The Restatement of the Law of Contracts2 sets down the general rule thus: "Any promise for which, the whole consideration or
part of the consideration is either marriage or a promise of marriage
is within the clause, 'contracts in which the consideration is marriage.
or a promise to marry, must be in writing,' except mutual promises of
two persons that are exclusively engagements to marry each other.
"Mutual promises to marry, though not within the above clause are
within the clause, 'bilateral contracts, so long as they are not fully performed by either party, which are not capable of performance within
a year from the time of their formation must be in writing,' if they
cannot be performed within a year."
In Brock v. Button the defendant had entered into an agreement of
marriage with the plaintiff. Both were divorcees and each had children
by a former marriage. Before the plaintiff had received her final decree, making them legally eligible to marry, the parties had freauentlv
discussed their future marriage. The defendant had unmarried dauahters and a son, fourteen years old. He promised the plaintiff that they
would get married as soon as the son went to college. Upon trial, the
nlaintiff was made to testify that she had not exoected the marriaee
to take place until the son went away to school. She testified that the
-on was still in high school and that -he would not be ready to E'o to
colleve until three years after the marriage agreement was made. The
son did go to school but the defendant refused to marry the blaintiff
whereupon suit was brought. The court held that since the contract
was not to be performed within a year, and since the plaintiff's own
testimony showed that the intention of both parties was to wait at
least three years, the contract was within the Statute of Frauds and
thereupon gave judgment to the defendant.
1 59 Pac. (2d) 761 (Wash. 1936).

2 § 192.
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Two other comparatively recent cases upon the subject are worthy
of note. In Spence v. Carters it was held that it is not essential to
the validity of. the marriage contract to set a specified time or place.
The place was prima facie presumed to be the bride's home and the
time was to be a reasonable time. The Court discussed the status of
the marriage contract in relation to the Statute of Frauds.It held that
a marriage contract is not within the Statute which requires contracts
that are not to be performed in one year from the time of the agreement to be in writing. The court reasoned that "any contract to marry
may possibly be performed within a year, and even 'where the terms
of the contract are such that it may or may not be performed within
a year, a writing is, under either view of the Statute, unnecessary.' "
(Italics are mine.) Evidently the Court interpreted this statement
from Corpus Juris to mean that a contract to marry is not to be construed as coming within the Statute. A close analysis of the statement,
however, and especially when taken with the rest of the context of
Corpus Juris, will show that the rule stated is not peculiar to marriage
contracts alone, as the Court 'had reasoned, but is the general rule
applicable to all contracts, that is, no contract need be in writing if
there is a possibility that it might be performed within a year. Yet the
Georgia Court is not alone in its interpretation of such contracts as an
examination of earlier cases will reveal.
Before taking up the earlier cases upon the matter another recent
case warrants attention. Dyer v. Lalor 4 serves as an intermediary between Brock v. Button and Spence v. Carter.The decision in this case
favored the plaintiff, but the Court's position as to the applicability
of the Statute of Frauds to marriage contracts was similar to Brock
v. Button. In this case the plaintiff entered into a marriage agreement
with the defendant in 1901. In 1916 they were still unmarried, and,
although there was no breach, the promise was renewed. The breach
finally came in 1918 when the defendant married another. The Court
held that since the marriage might have taken place within a year's
time the mere fact that it was not performed until many years had
elapsed did not place the contract within the Statute of Frauds. Here
the Court applied the same general rule which is true in all contract
cases, namely, that where there is a possibility that a contract will be
performed within a year, even though it had actually taken much longer to perform, the contract is not within the Statute of Frauds.
Early decisions in which the question of the applicability of the
Statute to contracts to marry have been raised may be classified into
those which interpreted the clause strictly and those which distinguished the case as not coming within the Statute or held that the
clause should not be too rigidly enforced with respect to marriage con8 126 S. E. 883 (Ga. 1924).
4 109 AtI. 30 (Vt. 1930).
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tracts. In Uttman v. Meyer 5 -the Court held that where the terms of
the agreement of marriage between the parties show that the marriage
was not to be performed until some time after the expiration of one
year, the contract was within the Statute of Frauds. In further discussing the problem the Court answered the objection that marriage
contracts were not intended to come within the Statute but to be governed by ecclesiastical courts maintaining that the judges had always
considered such contracts to be within the Statute.
Derby v. Pkelps 6 presents a case where the defendant being about
to enter into a profession, asked the plaintiff to receive his attentions
as a suitor and, in about five years, at which time he expected to be
well settled in business, to marry him. The Court held that this promise was within the Statute of Frauds, the same as any contract which
was not to be .performed within a year. The Court said: "This was an
agreement, which by the terms of it was not to be performed till the
expiration of about five years; hence comes within the very teeth of
the Statute."
In Paris v. Strong 7 the Statute was held to apply to marriage contract, the Court saying: "We do not doubt but that a contract of marriage not to be performed within a year, is within the Statute, as well
as a contract upon any other subject." This appears to be an expression of the rule as laid down by the majority of the Courts.
On the other hand we have cases in which the Statute was not applied, either because the factual situation was such as to take it without the Statute or because the Courts felt that the rule in regard to
contracts to marry should not be strictly applied. In Paris v. Strong
the promise proved upon trial was that the parties would marry within
three years. The Court held that since the contract may have been
performed within the year the Statute did not apply.
Lawrence v. Cooke,8 however, went much further in the interpretation of the facts so as to avoid the rule. Here the parties had been going together for some time when the plaintiff remarked that she had
been going with the defendant so long she felt engaged and thought
that she ought to know something definite about it. Two weeks later
she asked the same question saying that unless he fixed upon a time,
that "she might have something definite to look forward to" she could
not receive his love and affections. The defendant replied that he was
not financially able to marry then but that he could marry her within
four years. Upon the testimony of the plaintiff, herself, it was found
that she never intended that the marriage would take place within a
year and that both parties were willing to wait four years and expected
i
6
7
8

10 Fed. 241 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1882).
2 N. H. 515 (1822).
51 Ind. 339 (1875).
56 Me. 187 (1868).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER
to do so. The Court held that since the contract might have possibly
been performed within a year the Statute of Frauds would not apply.
Comparing this case with Derby v. Phelps, it will be seen that the
factual situations are about the same. In both cases the defendant
wanted to wait about four or five years before the fatal step. Ih
Derby v. Phelps the defendant promised to marry in about five years.
Yet the New Hampshire Court held that this was within the Statute
of Frauds. Why could not the Court of Maine have held that Lawrence v. Cooke was also within the Statute of Frauds? The evidence in
the trial, as well as the testimony of the plaintiff herself, showed that
the parties had not intended the marriage to be performed until some
time after a year had -passed. True, the defendant may have struck a
bit of fortune and have been financially able within a year; but why
could not the same be true in Derby v. Phelps? Here the reason for
the long wait was financial instability and it could be just as easily
reasoned that the parties in Derby v. Phelps could have possibly been
married within a year had the defendant attained a favorable position.
Blackburn v. Mann 9 presents a slightly varied aspect of the relationship of marriage contracts to the Statute of Frauds. Here the
defendant agreed to marry the plaintiff and the time was indefinitely
stated that "it might be a year or it might be ten." The Court held
this not to be within the Statute of Frauds saying, "Contracts of marriage, although defined as 'civil contracts,' are peculiar, and it is, perhaps, not entirely accurate to say they are subject to the same strict
construction as civil contracts in relation to property. As a general
rule, it may be no accurate terms are used in making them, nor is it
material any -precise day be fixed, at the making of such contract,
when it shall be fulfilled. Such matters are usually for future consideration, and really form no material part of the contract. The law implies, such contracts, in the absence of any special agreement, shall
be performed within a reasonable time. It is a relation that affects
the happiness of the parties for life, and it may be that years may
elapse, after the engagement is understood, before any day is definitely
agreed upon for consummation. Such contracts, until a breach is
shown that terminates them, may be regarded as continuing contracts
by consent of the parties, and hence are, in no just sense, within the
Statute of Frauds." Here the court maintained that the time of a
marriage need not be stated but that the agreement will be construed
to be continuing promises which are not affected by the Statute of
Frauds.
Two courts have held that the Statute of Frauds do not apply to
marriage contracts but were held to be peculiar in that it was subject
to the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts. Brick v. Gannar10 main9 85 fI. 222 (1877).
10

36 Hun 52 (1885).
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tained that the marriage contracts were not actionable under the
Statute of Frauds in England due to the above reason and as far as
they could determine this country had never allowed the Statute to
be a defense in marriage contract cases. This was followed in Nearing v. Van Fleet." The Maryland Court reached a similar conclusion
in Leuws v. Tapman. 2
Having examined the cases and observing that most jurisdictions
hold that contracts to marry which are not to be performed within a
year, are to be in writing, it would be well to note just what the writing
or memorandum should contain. The memorandum can be formal or
informal) and should be signed by the parties to 'be charged. It should
contain, with reasonable certainty, these three things: (1) The name
of each party or such description as will serve to identify him; (2)
The subject matter to which the contract relates; and (3) The terms
and conditions of all promises constituting the contract and by whom
and to whom the promise is made. The terms of a memorandum differ from a contract in that they may not be intended as the final complete statement of the contract. With these essentials wtitten in a
memorandum the contract is now without the Statute bf Frauds.
Carl W. Doozan.

WILLS-TEsTAMENTARY CAPACITY-BURDEN OF PRoof.-Before an
adequate understanding can be had of the problems surrounding the
burden of proving testamentary capacity in the probating of wills,
some attention must be given to what is meant -by "burden of proof."
Much of the conflict in the cases concerning this subject is directly
traceable to a failure by 'many courts to recognize that the term is
used in two distinct senses. It is used to indicate that the risk of nonpersuasion, or the burden of sustaining a particular position, is upon
either the proponent or the contestant (depending on the jurisdiction)
throughout the whole case, and, when used in this sense, it does not
shift during the trial. The term "burden of proof" is also used to indicate that the "burden of going forward with the evidence is upon
that party upon whom the burden is to establish his case until he introduces sufficient evidence to raise a presumption in his favor; and
that then the burden is thrown upon the other party to go forward
1
with the evidence in order to overcome the presumption against him,"
2
and, as used in this sense, the burden does shift during the trial.

11 45 N. E. 1133 (N. Y, 1897).
12 90 Md. 294, 45 AtI. 459 (1900).
1 22 ILL. L. REv. 785.
2 Donavan v. St. Joseph's Home, 295 III. 125, 131, 129 N. E. 1 (1920);
Carrol v. Eckley, 305 IM.367, 376, 137 N. E. 195 (1922); Grosh v. Acorn, 325
Ill. 474, 490, 156 N. E. 485 (1927); Note, 33 HA~v. L. REv. 558-660.
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Professor Atkinson says that the orthodox view of the burden of
proof upon the issue of mental capacity in a will contest, in the sense
of risk of nonpersuasion, is on the proponent.$ He supports this position As follows: "From the standpoint of logic, this view is supported
upon the ground that testator's capacity as well as due execution are
necessary or the validity of a will and that the proponent should prove
both elements of his case. More elemental and convincing is the argument of policy that the law should favor the heirs at law and that
he who seeks to defeat their interests should be handicapped by the
burden of proof upon the issue of testamentary capacity." 4
This position receives support from Professor Warren: 5 "The burden of establishing sanity and freedom from undue influence should
be upon the proponent. A will, unlike a contract, is a unilateral transaction, upon which other parties do not act until the court passes upon it. It may well said that insanity and coercion are not affirmative
defenses to be alleged and proved by the heir, but must be negatived
by those who insist on the will. The slight recognition of this in undue influence by Adams v. Cooper, 188 Ga. 339, 343, 96 S. E. 858
(1918), is gratifying in view of the great weight of authority to the
contrary. The current decisions in general fall into the common error
of failing to distinguish clearly between the burden of going forward
with evidence and the burden of establishing the issue."
In Adams v. Cooper 6 the court held that the burden of proving
testamentary capacity logically should rest upon the proponent. The
court said: "Upon the trial of an issue arising upon the propounding
of a will and a caveat thereto, the burden, in the first instance, is upon
the propounder of the alleged will to make out a prima facie case,
by showing the factum of the will, and that at the time of its execution the testator apparently had sufficient mental capacity to make
it, and in making it acted freely and voluntarily. When this is done,
the burden of proof shifts to the caveator."
"Mental capacity of the maker is one of the statutory requisites
of a valid will, and as a will is purely an unilateral act, to be passed
upon by the courts before others can act on it, proof of that. capacity
should form a material part of the proponent's case." 7
The burden of proof of testmentary capacity is, in many cases,
placed on the contestant. In some states this is the result of statutory
enactments which make the contestant the plaintiff, or which provide that the probate of a will shall be prima facie evidence of the
s ATKINsoN, HANDBOOx O THE LAW OF Wirs (1937) 512, 513, 514, and
cases cited.
4 ATKINSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 513.
5 Warren, Progress of the Law, 33 HARv. L. REv. 558.
6 148 Ga. 339, 96 S. E. 858 (1918).
7 23 MIcH. L. REv. 422.
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execution and validity of the will in case of a later contest.5 Even in
the absence of a statute, it is held in some jurisdictions that the burden
of proof is on the contestant.9
In a great many Illinois cases,' 0 according to Britt v. Darnell,"
the rule has been announced that "it is incumbent on the proponent
of a will to make out a prima fade case, in the first instance, by proper
proof of the due execution of the will by the testator and his mental
capacity; that the burden of proof is then on the contestants to prove
the allegations of their bill, by a preponderance of All the evidence,
that the testator was mentally incompetent. The law throws the weight
of the legal presumption in favor of sanity into the scale in favor of
the proponent, from which the cases hold that it necessarily results
that upon the whole case the burden of proof rests upon the contestants to prove the insanity of the testator. 12
Some courts which -have failed to distinguish between the two ideas
of "burden of proof" have held that after the .presumption of testamentary capacity has arisen, the burden of proving nontestamentary
capacity shifts to the contestant. Therefore when the situation arises
in these courts where the evidence is equally balanced and equally
conflicting, the contestant fails and the will is probated. "It is obvious
that, as a matter of sound reasoning, the burden which shifted to contestant, as soon as the presumption arose in favor of proponent, was
simply the 'burden of going forward with evidence of lack of testamentary capacity, the risk of nonpersuasion as to the presence of
capacity still remaining upon proponent. Where all the evidence is
evenly balanced, then, it must follow that proponent has failed to
sustain his -burden of proving testamentary capacity by a preponderance of the evidence, and the will cannot be admitted: 12 Harv. Law
Rev. 508; 13 Harv. Law Rev. 518." is
8 Op. cit. supra note 3; In re Latour's Estate, 140 Cal. 414, 73 Pac. 1070,
74 Pac. 441 (1903); Farleigh v. Kelley,, 28 Mont. 421, 72 Pac. 756 (1903); Dobie
v. Armstrong, 160 N. Y. 584, 55 N. E. 302 (1899); Dickey v. Dickey, 66 Okla.
269, 168 Pac. 1018 (1917); Bereton v. Glazeby's Estate, 251 Mich. 234, 231
N. W. 566 (1930); Walker v. Hinckley, 270 Mich. 33, 258 N. W. 206 (1935).
9 West v. Arrington, 200 Ala. 420, 78 So. 352 (1917); Stoll v. Stolls Ex'r,
213 Ky. 789, 281 S. W. 1028 (1926). See, also, Coman v. Lindley, 115 Kan. 802,
224 Pac. 912 (1924).
10 Entwistle v. Meikle, 180 Ill. 9, 54 N. E. 217 (1899); Baker v. Baker,
202 Ill. 595, 67 N. E. 410 (1903); Todd v. Todd, 221 Ill. 410, 77 N. E. 680
(1906); Chaney v. Baker, 304 Ill. 362, 136 N. E. 804 (1922); Williams v. Rag-

land, 307 Ill. 386, 138 N. E. 599 (1923).
11

146 N. E. 516, 315 El1. 385 (1925).
See 20 ILL. L. Rav. 313, in which following statement appears: "The
Illinois court in placing the burden on the contestant has explained that this was
due to the presumption of sanity; but it seems wrong to speak of presumptions
here. The will has been probated and unless the contestant proves the insanity
alleged, the will will stand, not because of a presumption, but simply because no
ground for setting it aside has been shown."
is
Op. cit. supra note 1.
12
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The line of decisions placing the burden of proof on the contestant
has a strong supporter in Maryland: 14 "The presumption of the law
is in favor of testamentary capacity, and the right of testamentary
disposition of property, which includes the right of revocation, ought
not to be imperiled by inconclusive or uncertain testimony."
Professor Atkinson supports what he calls the "orthodox" point of
view. However, he recognizes that the contrary viewpoint, viz., that
of placing the burden upon the contestant, is not devoid of good reason. He writes: 15 "The only sound reason for placing the risk of nonpersuasion upon contestant is that a fair division of the burdens calls
for regarding incapacity of testator as a matter of defense. Courts
generally consider mental incapacity in this light so far as deeds and
contracts are concerned, and an increasing number of holdings are
to the same effect in criminal cases. After all, the matter is not one
which can be solved on a mechanical basis. Ultimately the apportionment of the burden depends upon whether the court desires to favor
the heirs, or the devisees and legatees. The court's intuitive judgment,
rather than any logical principle, will be the determining factor. There
is nothing inherently unsound in placing the burden upon the contestant if this conclusion is reached upon a frank recognition of desire to favor testacy. However, the orthodox view seems to be the
better doctrine."
Similar reasoning is found in a Note in the Illinois Law Review: 16
"There are numerous criticisms of the decisions that hold that the
final burden is upon the contestant, because it is said the proponent
asserts that there is a valid will and, having the affirmative, he ought
to have the final burden of proof. The answer would seem to be that,
after all, the distribution of burdens of proof and the recognition of
presumptions are only means of securing the fair trial of disputes and
to fairly apportion the tasks involved in suits. Which party should as
a matter of practical convenience bear a certain burden may be a
difficult question, and one view will ibe no more correct than another;
instead both views are correct. A court may be justified in feeling
that wills are too easily overthrown on grounds of insanity of the testator, and feel that more cases would be decided right if the contestant had to prove the alleged insanity. It is a matter for the policy
of each jurisdiction to determine, though uniformity is desirable."
Therefore, it may be said, that barring those cases which were decided upon mistaken conception of the term "burden of proof," there
are two distinct lines of decisions, contrary to each other, concerning
the burden of proof of testamentary capacity, and neither point of
14 Home of the Aged of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Baltimore City
v. Bantz, 107 Md. 543, 69 AUt. 376 (1908).
15 Op. cit. supra note 3, at 514.
16 20 IL. L. REv. 313.

